Fundamentally, deliberative democracy is an institution in which participants communicate and then vote. We analyze strategic behavior in this type of institution when agents do not necessarily have common beliefs and values. The potential for some pairs of participants to have diametrically opposed preferences makes it difficult to support equilibria in which participants truthfully reveal their private information. Nonetheless, truthful equilibria are shown to exist for some (but not all) parameterizations in which non-common values are likely. Truthful equilibria exist if and only if participants of all possible preference types believe that it is more likely that a majority of the group share their preference type than a majority of the group have opposed preferences.
Introduction
There are again two methods of removing the causes of fraction: the one, by destroying the liberty..., the other, by giving every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. .... The second expedient is as impractical as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.
As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests... In many collective choice settings, like legislatures, town-hall meetings, corporate board meetings, advisory committee meetings, and of course faculty meetings, individuals can freely communicate prior to formal voting procedures. The possibility of argument, debate and even reasoned discourse offered by these deliberative settings has not escaped the attention of prominent scholars. 2 In recent scholarship, Sunstein (1988) , for instance, argues that deliberation can lead to "uniquely correct outcomes", and Guttman and Thompson (1996) "believe that a deliberative perspective can help resolve some moral disagreements in democratic politics,.." and, "... help citizens treat one another with mutual respect as they deal with the disagreements that invariably remain"(p. 9). Fishkin (1991) defends several reforms that introduce deliberation by randomly selected masses to various stages of the republican system. Despite its broad appeal to normative scholars, deliberation has been challenged by several authors 3 and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of deliberation is mixed. Mendelberg (2002) precursor to the development of compelling normative arguments about the effectiveness of deliberation as a means for aggregating private information and making collective choices.
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In this study we address a basic question: In a deliberative setting in which (i) agents may have extremely heterogenous preferences (or conceptions of the good) which preclude universally-acceptable consensus, and (ii) these preferences are private information, to what extend do the incentives to deceive each other limit the potential for information transmission and aggregation?
The tension between a notion of the public good and private values has been noted by normative scholars.
Guttman and Thompson write, "The aim of moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy prescribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principal is reciprocity,.." They go on to define reciprocity, " [reciprocity] can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit than one expects others to adopt)" (p.2).
Sunstein explains, "The republican belief in deliberation counsels political actors to achieve a measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting these desires and practices to scrutiny and review," but he concedes that "this is not to suggest that deliberation calls for some standard entirely external to private beliefs and values (as if such a thing could be imagined)." This paper is fixed in the rational choice perspective, focusing on the effectiveness of deliberation in aggregating private beliefs and values when participants are prudent (or self interested). The findings are mixed in their support for deliberative democracy. First, in some cases in which agents might have diametrically opposed preferences equilibria in which agents are truthful exist. Despite this, the presence of such truthful equilibria hinges on individual perceptions about the likelihood that most participants have similar values. As such, efficient information transmission requires that everyone believe they are likely to have the values of the majority. Second, even if truthful equilibria fail to exist, very large deliberative bodies will select decisions that are optimal for a majority of the participants. These findings suggest that despite the existence of private beliefs and values deliberation may be effective.
The analysis demonstrates a tension between broad participation (the size of a group) and the effectiveness of its deliberation. Democratic scholars have long noted that democracies cannot function if they are too large. Madison, for instance argued that the United States was to geographically vast for direct democracy (Federalist 14) . Hamilton concluded that even many of the states were too large for effective direct democracy (Federalist 9). In contrast, Condorcet's (1786) argument concludes that the larger the population the higher the probability that a democracy will make the "right" decision. Interestingly, the 1970's saw debate about reforming jury sizes in U.S. jury trials. Proponents of the reform were worried that with 12 jurors it was too likely that a peculiar juror would derail deliberation.
While the desirability of participants is ambiguous, preference homogeneity is unequivocally desirable, as increased confidence that participants are similar makes truthful behavior easier to support. Overall then, whereas some normative scholars view deliberation as a means by which heterogenous interests can come together and reach consensus, with larger groups being better, the analysis demonstrates that from the perspective of aggregating private values and beliefs to make policy decisions, small homogenous groups are likely to outperform large heterogenous groups. hearing the public speeches agents will agree on which course of action is most desirable. A key feature of this model is the assumption that all agents have very similar preferences (they want to convict guilty defendants, and acquit innocent ones) and that all agents know that they all have similar preferences. 6 In the language of game theory, the problem involves common knowledge of common values.
Related Literature
While this first finding is promising for deliberative democrats, it should not be over-weighted. A defense for deliberative democracy that rests on the assumption that their are no pluralistic concerns is underwhelm- generalized as the authors demonstrate that under a minimal set of assumptions the equilibrium set will be better under majority rule then under unanimity rule. This finding suggests that the appeal of unanimity rule may have been overstated by scholars of deliberative democracy. In an alternative mechanism design approach Gerardi and Yariv (2003) establish an equivalence between equilibria for all voting rules (except unanimity rule). Their paper allows for a large class of preferences profiles by agents -including deliberation problems in which agents may have diametrically opposed preferences so that their need not be commonality about how preferences over policies vary with private information. Gerardi and Yariv tell us that aside from unanimity rule the rule choice does not matter very much, but they are silent on the potential for information transmission and aggregation in these models with possibly opposed preferences as the equilibrium set is not characterized. It is here that the current paper makes a contribution.
We consider deliberative settings where (1) agents are uncertain both about some payoff relevant state, (for example a factual question like whether a policy decision will save tax-payer money, or a corporate decision will increase short-term profits), and (2) agents posses private information about their state-policy contingent preferences. So in these examples it is not known a priori that everyone in the room wishes to reduce taxes or maximize short-term profits, some pairs of individuals may have diametrically opposed preferences (but not know it).
7
In other words an agent may know that she prefers to choose a policy that increases corporate profits, but she is not certain that everyone else in the deliberative body shares this preference. We investigate how this fact strains reliance on information that others provide. One interpretation is that of deliberation with potential saboteurs. The current model violates the monotonicity condition (axiom 3) in Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2003b) , which requires commonality on how the uncertain state influences induced preferences over the policy alternatives. Here, with positive probability there will be a pair of agents having induced preferences that respond to information about the state in opposite directions. In the jury setting this possibility may be unlikely -requiring that agents fear some jurors prefer convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty -but in other collective choice settings it can be quite likely. One recent example involves corporate governance following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which attempts to increase diversity on corporate boards. As the net of potential members enlarges, so does the potential for conflicting preferences. We may worry that once board members face severe uncertainty about the motivations of other board members the effectiveness of deliberative decision-making may suffer.
Another example involves a bureaucratic agency, consisting of some political appointees and some career bureaucrats, that make policy recommendations. In these last two examples the probability of preference heterogeneity may be a policy lever that institution designers can control.
In section 2 we present the basic model. In section 3 we focus first on truthful equilibria, stating necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence and then we characterize a particularly simple type of non-truthful equilibria. Section 4 considers the asymptotic properties of these equilibria proving that in the limit the full information majority rule decision is reached. In section 5 we highlight the potential trade-off between group size and informational efficiency. In section 6 we conclude with a brief discussion. The appendix presents an application of the revelation principal to this model showing the relationship between the set of truthful equilibria with a binary message space and the set of separating equilibria in games with a larger message space. We consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} (n odd) that must make a binary group decision, choosing a policy p ∈ P = {a, b}. Each agent has a binary preference type θ i ∈ Θ = {−1, 1} and there is an unknown state of the world x ∈ X = {a, b}. The common prior probability over the state is pr(x = a) = π ≥ 1 2 . Agent i has a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that depends on the policy p ∈ P the state x ∈ X and her type θ i ∈ Θ. This utility function is of the form
The Model
where 1 {p=x) is the indicator function taking value 1 if p = x and 0 otherwise. So type θ 1 = 1 agents want to match x and p while type θ i = −1 agents want x and p unmatched. The potential for agents of both types captures a stark case of potentially opposed preferences. To capture situations in which agents are uncertain about the preferences of the other members of the deliberative body, we assume that only agent i knows her type. In addition the agents do not observe x, but instead each agent receives an informative private signal s i ∈ {a, b} about x with pr(
. These signals are assumed to be conditionally (on x) independent. Thus, each agent observes a private signal (θ i , s i ) ∈ {−1, 1} × {a, b}. Finally, we model the generation of preference types in the following manner. With probability c ∈ [0, 1] the population has common values and with probability 1 − c the individual preference types are i.i.d draws. Specifically, . We assume that the generation of agent types and the state x are independent. For c close to 1 and/or z close to 1 this is a model in which it is highly likely that the population has common values, but agents know that there is a chance that some members of the population have dissimilar preferences.
The above describes a lottery over the state space Ω := X × Θ n × {a, b} n . The first n + 1 dimensions represent payoff relevant information and the last n dimensions represent the imperfect signals that agents learn. We model deliberation as a simple two period Bayesian game of common knowledge with this state space. In period 0 nature selects the agent types, state and signals -with each agent observing her own preference type and signal (θ i , s i ). In period 1 agents simultaneously send public messages, m i ∈ {a, b}.
By m = (m 1 , ..., m n ) we denote the profile of messages. In period 2 each agent having observed m casts a simultaneous binary vote, v i ∈ {a, b}. We assume that the collective decision is made with majority rule. So
A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly undominated voting is a speech function m(θ i , s i ) :
→ {a, b} and a belief system satisfying the requirements that the strategies are sequentially rational, the beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule when it applies, and the voting rule does not select the agent's second ranked alternative (given her beliefs about x conditional on m).
Equilibria

Truthful equilibria
In this setting, if x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ n were commonly known weakly undominated voting would yield the policy
If instead only the preference types θ and the private signals s were public knowledge undominated voting would yield the policy
where
and a(s) is the number of private signals with value a and b(s) is the number of private signals with value b.
We now investigate whether there is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly undominated voting strategies which implements the decision rule p + (θ, s). We focus on the potential for truthful equilibria.
In the appendix we show that a truthful equilibria will exist in this game if and only if a fully-revealing equilibrium exists when the message space has at least two elements. Thus, the focus on truthful equilibria and binary message spaces is not restrictive. Suppose agents are truthful, using the message function
denote the number of messages that say a is the state and b(m) the number that say b is the state. Based on the public messages m = ω 2 , consistency requires that agent posteriors on x satisfy Bayes' rule
Weak dominance requires that the individual voting rule satisfies,
We ignore the knife-edged parameterizations in which pr(x = a | m) = 1 2 is possible (with truthful messages). In a truthful equilibrium, all agents have the same information at the time that they cast ballots. Because they have opposing preferences, agents of types θ i = 1 and θ i = −1 will respond to pr(x = a | a(m), b(m)) in different manners. The former (latter) will prefer a when pr(x = a | a(m), b(m)) is high (low). Given that k of the n − 1 others are announcing m 1 = a a unilateral deviation by agent i in the message stage will effect voting behavior iff
If this condition is not true for any k < n then the messages will not effect voting and a truthful equilibrium trivially exists. In a truthful equilibrium, it must be the case that agent i would prefer to send a truthful message. In order for this to be the case the incentive to provide the agents with the same type as agent i the correct information when (7) is satisfied must dominate the incentive to provide agents with the other type incorrect information when (7) is satisfied. This will be the case if given θ i the probability that at least n+1 2 agents have type θ i exceeds the probability that at least n+1 2 agents have type not equal to θ i . Since the types and signals are independent, an agent's assessment of the probability that she is in the majority preference type is independent of her private signal s i . Specifically, agent i is willing to truthfully reveal s i if either (7) is not satisfied for any k or
The inequality in (7) is satisfied for some k if
which is equivalent to
Given the probability model, Bayes' rule yields
Since z ≥ 1 2 ≥ 1 − z this implies that if z < 1 the conditional probability that a decisive coalition of other participants has type θ j = θ i η(c, z, n) := min
and if z = 1 then η(c, z, n) = 1. Similarly the conditional probability that a decisive coalition has type
When (10) is satisfied the existence of truthful equilibria hinges on η ≥ µ. To see this note that in a truthful equilibrium if the number of agents in N \i with type θ = 1 is exactly n−1 2 then i's expected utility from truthfulness about s i or dishonesty about s i followed by optimal voting is the same. In the remaining cases where at least This characterization can be tightened if we consider whether a parameterization (π, c, z) will have truthful PBE in weakly undominated voting for arbitrary n.
Proposition 2 A truthful PBE in weakly undominated strategies exists for arbitrary n iff at least one of the following conditions is true: 
The intuition is straightforward. In order for a truthful equilibrium to exist it must be the case that either messages do not effect voting, as is the case if (10) is not satisfied, or for any profile of private information an agent with this information will believe that she is more likely to have the same preference type as a majority of the voters and thus want to communicate her private information to the majority. . However, if we start with a game with c = 0 and z = 1 (common knowledge of common values) and then consider a perturbation with c + ε c < 1 2 proposition 2 tells us that this perturbation will not have truthful equilibria for every n. But since by taking ε sufficiently small we can make the probability of any measurable event arbitrarily close under the original and perturbed games (for a fixed n) in a very real sense a model with c < [ Figure 1 about here]
The conclusions of this robustness analysis are restated in the following result. 
Non truthful equilibria
When neither of the sufficient conditions in proposition 1 are satisfied then in any PBE in weakly undominated voting some agents are not correctly revealing their signal s i . In the appendix we shown that truthful equilibria exist in this game iff separating equilibria exist in a game with at least two possible messages. We now characterize a particularly simple equilibrium when z > and agents with θ i = −1 announce m i = s i . So if x = a then agent j will announce message a in the events that (1) agent j has type θ = 1 (because it is common values with this type or non-common values and this is her draw) and she observes a, or (2) agent j has type θ = −1 (because it is common values with this type or non-commmon values and this is her draw) and she observes b. Since agent i observes her type at least one possible common values scenario (everyone has type opposite of the realized θ i ) can be ruled out. Accordingly, the probability that an agent sends message m j = a given that the state is x = a and θ i = 1 is
Note that ρ(b | b, 1) = ρ(a | a, 1). Similarly, the probability that an agent sends message m j = a given that the state is x = b and θ i = 1 is
Note that ρ(b | a, 1) = ρ(a | b, 1). The probability that an agent sends message m j = a given that the state is x = a and
Note that ρ(b | b, −1) = ρ(a | a, −1). The probability that an agent sends message m j = a given that the state is x = b and
Note that ρ(b | a, −1) = ρ(a | b, −1).
Using these terms we can express the posterior probability of x = a given the public messages m ( and the summary statistics a(m) and b(m)) of the remaining n − 1 agents and agent i's private information (θ i , s i )
where φ(s 1 ) is g if s i = a and 1 − g if s i = b. Agent i's message is payoff relevant in the event that for some k < n − 1, and pair (s i , θ i ) either.
or
For a triple (k, s i , θ i ) in which one of the above conditions is satisfied agent j's message will influence agent i's voting. In contrast to the case of truthful messages, here it need not be the case that higher a(m) means x = a is more likely. Specifically, we need to worry about the possibility of (20) 
and
with the former larger (weakly) since g > (1 − g) and z > (1 − z). For θ i = −1 the relevant terms are
Again the former is larger (weakly) since g > (1 − g) and z > (1 − z). and at g = z = 1 2 the difference is 0.
Thus if players N \j are using the conjectured strategy profile, regardless of j's private information, if θ j = 1 (θ j = −1) and j's weakly undominated best response following a(m) and b(m) messages of a and b is to vote for a (b) then following a (m) > a(m) messages of a agent j's weakly undominated best response will be to vote for a (b). And similarly increasing the number of messages for b will make a θ j = 1 (θ j = −1) type more satisfied with voting for b (a). Since the likely majority preference type is θ i = 1 (as z > 1 2 ) this monotonicity implies that agent i s best response is to announce a if she would prefer that a is selected and announce b if she would prefer that b is selected. We now examine the form of i's induced preferences over messages.
In Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2003a the relevant condition is whether a or b is desirable conditional on being pivotal (message pivotal). However, here agents of type θ i = 1 can only be dissatisfied with the outcome that results from being truthful (when everyone else plays the conjectured equilibrium) if it is the case that their message was irrelevant (not message pivotal). Alternatively, agents of type θ i = −1 can only be dissatisfied with the outcome that results from lying (when everyone else plays the conjectured equilibrium) if they are not message pivotal.
To see this, consider an agent i with s i = a and θ i = 1. The conjectured equilibrium calls for m i = a.
When would such a message turn out to be suboptimal for agent i? This can occur only if following the messages m agent i prefers policy b (because there are k other messages of a and pr(x = a | k, n−k−1, θ i , a) < 1 2 ) but a passes and would not have passed had m i = b been announced (thus i's message was pivotal). However, since s i = a if given the public messages i believes that b is more likely than a than every other agent will form the same conclusion based on the public messages and their own private signal. This is true because This would require that she wound up preferring a and her message caused b to be chosen. Again since she has a signal of a and believes that b is more likely conditional on the messages everyone must form the same conclusion and thus her message could not have been influential. Finally for an agent i with s i = b and θ i = −1. When would i be dissatisfied with her message of a? This would require that she wound up preferring b and her message caused a to be chosen. Again since she has a signal of b and believes that a is more likely conditional on the messages everyone must form the same conclusion and thus her message could not have been influential. Accordingly, if θ i = −1 then m i (s i ) = s i is a best response.
In an equilibrium of this type it is believed that more agents are sending truthful messages then none truthful messages (since the probability that an individual is of type θ i = 1 is greater than 1 2 ). Given this, in forming beliefs about the state, more messages of a increase the posterior probability that x = a. Again since it is expected that more agents will be of type θ i = 1 this means that more messages of a increase the likelihood (weakly) that a is passed. In deciding what message to send agents first determine if they expect to be in the majority or minority in terms of preference types θ i . If they expect to be in the majority (here θ i = 1) then they truthfully reveal their private information about x. However, if they expect to be in the minority (θ i = −1) they lie sending the opposite message. This behavior is rational for the agent because if their message has any effect on the final voting it will be in the natural way: saying a increases the likelihood that a is enacted and if an agent decides that based on hearing the messages she prefers a policy other than the one she advocated it must be the case that either a majority of the individuals will also wind up supporting the agent's new preferred policy or the agent's message was inconsequential.
Assume participants use this message strategy, let m p ∈ {a, b} denote the message that obtains a plurality and assume that participants N \j use the voting rule 
Efficiency
Since a truthful equilibrium with weakly undominated voting strategies implements the decision rule (3) it fully aggregates the private information. We now consider what happens as the population size tends to infinity showing that the probability that the decision corresponds to that of (2) approaches one. Since individual signals, s i are conditionally independent the probability that the majority of public messages are correct tends to one. This result is a version of the statistical Condorcet Jury Theorem (Berend and Paroush 1998) . Given this the probability that individuals in society know x converges to 1, and thus under weakly undominated voting the majority decision will correspond to the majority preferred policy (with x known) with probability approaching one. 10 We now formalize this argument.
Let Γ(n, c, z, g, π) denote a deliberation game with parameters n, c, z, g,π satisfying one of the conditions in proposition 2. Consider the triangular array of independent games, with n (odd) tending to infinity.
Let the random variable x T (Γ(n, c, z, g, π)) denote the realized state in game Γ(n, c, z, g, π). Let the random variable θ T (Γ(n, c, z, g, π)) denote the preference type of the majority of voters in the game. Let the random variable m T (Γ(n, c, z, g, π)) denote the message that is sent by the majority of senders in the truthful PBE in weakly undominated voting to the game. Let o T (Γ(n, c, z, g, π)) denote the state that is more likely under pr(x | a(m), b(m)) characterized by (5) . Let the random variable p T (Γ(n, c, z, q, π)) denote the policy that is chosen in the truthful PBE in weakly undominated voting to the game. Let the random variable h T (Γ(n, c, z, g, π)) denote the majority rule core decision in the problem in which x and θ is known (chosen by the rule in (2). Thus
Proposition 4 If c, z satisfy the conditions of proposition 2 (c ≥
Proof: Assume the hypothesis. For each n in the selected PBE to Γ(n, c, z, g, π) each message is an i.i.d draw that corresponds to x with probability g > 1 2 . By the statistical Condorcet Jury Theorem for independent draws
Since the optimal decision rule p + in (3) will do at least as well as a rule that concludes that n, c, z, g, π) ) we have
Since weakly undominated voting selects p
We now consider the asymptotics of sequences of non-truthful PBE establishing that the equilibria characterized in Proposition 3 also fully aggregate information in the limit. Let z, g > and let
) represent the random variables for equilibria characterized in proposition 3. So the superscript L captures the fact that some participants lie.
Proposition 5 If z, g satisfy the conditions of proposition
Proof: Assume the hypothesis. For each n in the selected PBE to Γ(n, c, z, g, π) the probability that an individual message corresponds to the state is
Since the games form a triangular array of independent draws, we have
Since the rule that individual voters use (27) depends on the posterior (19) that uses m L (Γ(n, c, z, g, π) and additional information individual voters will do no worse at choosing the action they want than if the based their decision on just m L (Γ(n, c, z, g, π) . We consider sequences of two conditional probabilities. The previous argument implies that
and thus
Similarly,
But these two statements mean that
Proposition 4 demonstrates that with truthful messages, full-information majority rule outcomes are chosen with probability approaching one even though the problem does not involve common values. Proposition 5 demonstrates that even when there are not equilibria with truthful messages there are sequences of equilibria in which full information majority rule outcomes are chosen with probability approaching one.
From the perspective of proposition 5 a key feature of the model is that agents have common knowledge about which type is more likely to be held by a majority of voters. If instead there was first a lottery over whether z took the value 
Medium sized groups
Propositions 4 and 5 demonstrate that full-revelation is not necessary for large population efficiency. We now consider the desirability of subtracting members from a deliberative body. For convenience in this section we assume that π = ) it is not difficult to see that the probability that the majority rule core is reached increases with the group size. This is true
)] is increasing in n. However, this need not hold in a parameterization that violates the conditions of proposition 2. We construct a simple example with c < and z > 1 2 that demonstrates the pathology, at n = 3 a truthful equilibria exists but at n = 5 it does not. To rule out the trivial cases we assume that (10) is satisfied. Proposition 1 tells us that a truthful equilibria exists with n = 3 if
In order to have
we need
So for z = 
But for z = 
and the right hand side is
In this case a truthful equilibria exists with n = 3 but not with n ≥ 5. More generally, when truthful equilibria exist for some but not all population sizes, we have a critical population size at which adding participants is unattractive.
Proposition 6
If the conditions of proposition 2 are not satisfied then either truthful equilibria do not exist for any n or there exists an n * such that at n < n * a truthful equilibria exists and at n > n * no truthful equilibria exist.
Proof: Pick z, c, π that don't satisfy the conditions of proposition 2. By the proof of proposition 2 this means that η(c, z, n) − µ(c, z, n) is eventually bounded below 0. This means that for some n * if n > n * then there is not a truthful equilibria. Now either this is true for n * = 1 in which case there are not truthful equilibria for any n, or there is a maximal number n such that η(c, z, n ) − µ(c, z, n ) ≥ 0. Since η(c, z, n ) − µ(c, z, n ) is monotone in n, letting n * = n establishes the critical n * .
Whether the probability that the majority rule core is reached is higher at n * or n * + 2 hinges on the parameters. With the symmetry afforded by π = 1 2 ,in the truthful equilbria agent induced preferences over voting depend only on whether a majority of public messages are a or b. The probability that the majority rule core is reached at n * is
This term is
In the non-truthful equilibria, since not all private information about s is public, when the number of a messages is close to the number of b messages a participant that has s i different than the modal message m p may still believe that her private signal is correct. This is true because g ≥ q = zg
where the latter measures the quality of public messages as perceived by the participants. However, all participants whose private signals match the modal public message, will have the same preferences over the choices as they did based just on their private signal. This group is a majority. Accordingly, at least a majority of participants will cast votes that correspond to their message. Accordingly, the probability that the non-truthful equilibrium selects the majority rule core corresponds to the probability that a majority of participants send messages that correspond to the state. This term is:
The ordering of (46) and (47) depends on how much smaller is q than g. As an example where the addition of two people lowers the probability that the majority rule decision is reached we return to the case of z = . In this case (46) is
while (47) is
At g = .6 the former is 0.64 and the latter is approximately 0.61 indicating that the smaller group (using a truthful equilibria) performs better than the slightly larger group (for which no truthful equilibrium exists).
This example leads to the following conclusion.
Proposition 7
There are parameterizations which do not satisfy the conditions of proposition 2 for which excluding randomly selected participants increases the likelihood that the deliberative body selects the fullinformation majority rule core policy.
An immediate question is how long it takes for the statistical effect to swamp the equilibrium effect? In otherwords, while the proposition says that sometimes group performance is better at n * then n * + 2, the applicability of the result is limited if group performance at n * + 4 is better than at n * . Figure 2 depicts the probability that the best equilibrium selects the majority rule core as a function of group size n for plausible values of the parameters. By the time n gets to n * the truthful equilibria tends to do quite well. However once n exceeds n * the probability of a core can be dramatically lower and the curve is not very steep.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
If it is finite and non-zero the value n * solves the program
The inequality is of the form
Since this difference is increasing in c and decreasing in n if c > c then n * (c , z) ≥ n * (c, z). Moreover, since the difference is decreasing in z if z > z then n * (c, z ) ≤ n * (c, z). This leads to the following conclusion Proposition 8 The critical value, n * (c, z), is increasing in c and decreasing in z. Figure 3 plotts the function n * (c, z). Note that n * does not depend on g. Several conclusion are worth emphasizing. For values of z greater than .6, n * is less than 50 and if c < .3 then n * is less than 50.
Moreover, for most parameterizations n * is less than 25. So for problems in which preference heterogeneity is relatively likely n * is fairly small (smaller than the capacity of New-England town halls).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We have seen that deliberation at n * + 2 can fair worse than deliberation at n * but of course this is not always the case. Figure 4 demonstrates the pervasiveness of the finding that smaller deliberative bodies can be better. Interestingly, the prevalence of environments in which group performance is non-monotonic in n is higher for hard problems in which individual signals about the state are of low quality (g closer to [Insert Figure 4 here]
Discussion
The analysis offers some good news for deliberative democrats. It is not necessary that everyone know a priori that their is commonality of interests for strategic participants to reveal their private information.
Individuals believing that the potential for saboteurs (or just participants with very different interests) is non-trivial may still be willing to reveal their private information. Truthful deliberation is possible as long as each participant believes that more than half of the other participants will have the same preferences as her.
As such, heterogeneity is not a problem if participants are confident that most others share their tastes. This finding suggests that the "egocentism bias" ( Most interestingly, more participants need not be better. In some cases truthful equilibria exist for a small deliberative body and adding an additional few individuals can destroy the truthful equilibria resulting in less efficient decisions. In addition the number of additional agents needed for the Condorcetian statistical effect to offset the loss of effective information transmission can be quite large. Loosely stated, we find that for small deliberative bodies, truthful deliberation is easiest to support, but that in very large bodies efficient decisions are reached even without truthful discourse. For medium sized bodies removal of enough participants to restore truthful equilibria can be desirable. A promising avenue for future work is the consideration of alternative institutional arrangements which foster information sharing in problems of choice with private beliefs and values.
Appendix
We now establish a version of the revelation principal equating the existence of truthful equilibria in the binary message game to separating equilibria in games with a larger message space. Let Γ(n, c, z, g, π) denote a deliberation game with parameters n, c, z, g,π and let Γ Π (n, c, z, g, π) denote a modified deliberation game with parameters n, c, z, g,π and a larger message space, Π, which contains at least 2 messages.
Proposition 9 A truthful PBE in weakly undominated voting exists in Γ(n, c, z, g, π) iff a separating PBE in weakly undominated voting exists in Γ Π (n, c, z, g, π).
Proof: (⇐) Assume that Γ Π (n, c, z, g, π) has a separating PBE in weakly undominated voting.
Since the equilibrium is separating, consistency of beliefs requires that on the path agents believe that s = (s 1 , ...., s n ) is public information prior to voting. Now since the message mapping must be invertible, and all types are possible, any agent can send a message that leads the others to believe that she has a signal different than s i . Accordingly, since a separating equilibrium exists it must be the case that either (10) is satisfied or η(c, z, n) ≥ c z n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*does better than n*+2 n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n* n*+2 does better than n*
